Innsigle Reference Claim System: Colophon, Storage, Signing

Generated reference: edit sources under docs/helix/, then npm run site:build.

Generated from HELIX docs. Source: docs/helix/02-design/claim-system.md. Edit the source, not this file or site/ HTML.
Source frontmatter
ddx:
  id: innsigle.design.claim-system
  type: solution-design
  links:
    - target: innsigle.prd
      kind: informed_by
    - target: innsigle.design.attestation-prior-art
      kind: informed_by
    - target: innsigle.design-system
      kind: informed_by
status: draft
activity: 02-design
created: 2026-07-22

Claim System: Colophon, Storage, Signing

Solution-level design for composition declaration and optional attestation. Normative field names here are design intent; freeze in a Contract before implementing the CLI.

Prior art stance: in-toto-shaped subject/predicate; PGP/DKIM-shaped long-lived keys; TOFU key discovery for v1; optional later WoT cross-signs. Details: attestation-prior-art.md.

Goals

GoalSource
Typed colophon with named tools (Claude, sloptimizer, …)PRD FR-1–4, FR-4a
Sign content hash + bill + issuerPRD FR-9–12
Docs-friendly storage (no media embed required)UC-AI-docs
Social-safe mark without claim-in-fileUC-human-social
Not a detector; edit ≠ human-authoredPrinciples, FR-4a

Naming

TermMeaning
Colophon (colo)Declared recipe of how the work was made (composition + ingredients); short form colo
CompositionCoarse state: human-authored \mixed \model-primary
IngredientOne tool, model, or human role line item
ClaimJSON document: subjects + colophon + metadata (unsigned or to-be-signed body)
AttestationClaim body + signature by an issuer key
IssuerPerson or house key that signs
SubjectContent unit identified by digest (and optional URI)
Seal / markVisual Innsigle badge; valid signed or unsigned (see DESIGN.md)
MakerPublisher/operator who applies the seal (not human-author-only)
SigilBounded synonym for the mark as recognition surface; not occult
SignetOptional act of cryptographically signing; not always-on chrome
Plain sealUnsigned colophon bound to a title/URI, not a content digest. Type https://innsigle.dev/claim/plain-colophon/v1. Never VALID.
Maker profileLinktree-style page (innsigle_profile) listing a maker, links, and plain seals. Bio URL. Optional issuer discovery.
Human keyOperator-held key (1Password / local PEM, never CI). Seals human-authored and mixed sources in git (ADR-004).
Build keyCI-held key (INNSIGLE_BUILD_KEY). Seals model-primary / generated: true sources. Endorsed by the human key.
Derived pageDeterministic HTML (or other render) of a sealed source. Quotes the source attestation; the human signature does not cover the HTML bytes.

Avoid public "credentials" for the product object (C2PA collision). Internal type URIs may still say attestation.

Colophon schema (draft v1)

Conceptual model

Colophon
  composition: enum
  ingredients[]: Ingredient
  notes?: string          # short free text; not a loophole for hiding models
  provenance?: {          # optional pointer to session provenance (L2)
    kind: "session"
    digest: { alg, value }
    uri?: string
  }
  schema_version: "1"

Ingredient
  kind: model | tool | human | other
  name: string            # "Claude", "sloptimizer", "Erik LaBianca"
  role?: string           # "draft", "edit", "structure", "rewrite"
  version?: string        # model id or tool version when known
  uri?: string            # optional link to product/docs

Detailed machine history (prompt counts, skill runs, compact timeline) lives in a session provenance document—see session-provenance.md and FEAT-004. The colo stays short; L2 is optional and linked by digest.

Composition enum

ValueWhen to use
human-authoredSubstantive prose/media produced by humans; models not primary authors
mixedMaterial human and model authorship both present
model-primaryModel(s) produced most of the substantive content; humans may edit/structure

Rule (FR-4a): Running sloptimizer (or similar) on model output does not by itself change model-primary → human-authored. List sloptimizer as kind: tool, role: rewrite (or similar).

Claim document (unsigned body)

{
  "innsigle": "1",
  "type": "https://innsigle.dev/claim/colophon/v1",
  "issued_at": "2026-07-22T18:00:00Z",
  "issuer": {
    "id": "azgaard",
    "name": "Azgaard",
    "key_id": "ed25519:BASE64URL_FINGERPRINT",
    "key_url": "https://azgaard.net/.well-known/innsigle/keys.json"
  },
  "subjects": [
    {
      "uri": "https://example.com/docs/page/",
      "digest": {
        "alg": "sha256",
        "value": "hex-or-base64url"
      }
    }
  ],
  "colophon": {
    "schema_version": "1",
    "composition": "model-primary",
    "ingredients": [
      {
        "kind": "model",
        "name": "Claude",
        "role": "draft",
        "version": null
      },
      {
        "kind": "tool",
        "name": "sloptimizer",
        "role": "rewrite",
        "uri": "https://github.com/easel/easel-skills"
      },
      {
        "kind": "human",
        "name": "Erik",
        "role": "structure-edit"
      }
    ],
    "notes": null
  }
}

Aligns with in-toto mentally: subjects ≈ subject digests; colophon ≈ predicate; type ≈ predicateType. v1 may ship this JSON without full DSSE.

Canonical content hashing

Contentv1 approach
Single fileSHA-256 of raw bytes
HTML pageSHA-256 of canonical bytes defined by CLI (document exact rules in Contract): prefer raw file as published, or normalized UTF-8 without volatile fields
Multi-page sitePer-page claims, or one claim with multiple subjects (release set)

Open: strip HTML comments / CDN query strings? Prefer: hash the artifact the operator points at; document foot-guns.

Storage mechanisms

Design constraints

  • Docs sites: static hosting, no required DB.
  • Social: no reliance on platform-preserved metadata.
  • Verify: offline possible given claim + content + pubkey.

v1 stores

StoreWhat lives thereChannel
A. Sidecar filepage.innsigle.json next to content or in /.well-known/innsigle/claims/…Docs
B. Embedded linkFooter mark links to claim URL or #innsigle fragment pageDocs
C. Inline unsigned billHuman-readable bill in HTML (optional duplicate of JSON fields)Docs
D. Mark asset onlySVG/PNG + link to profile/colo explainer; no per-post signatureSocial
E. Key documentkeys.json (public keys, key_id, optional revoke)Discovery

Not v1 (parked)

StoreWhy park
C2PA embed in JPEG/PNGSocial strip; media-first
Central claim databaseScope
DNS TXT for full claimSize; use for key selectors later (DKIM-like)
Blockchain / always-on transparency logOptional later (Sigstore Rekor-class)

Docs (signed page):

site/
  docs/foo/index.html          # footer → seal + link
  .well-known/innsigle/
    keys.json
    claims/docs-foo.json       # attestation (claim + sig)

Social:

mark: innsigle-human.svg (or PNG)
bio: https://azgaard.net/innsigle
# no per-tweet claim file required in v1

Signing and attestation

Algorithms (v1 proposal)

ChoiceProposalRationale
SignEd25519Small keys, modern default, wide support
HashSHA-256Universal
Key encodeJWK or raw base64url in keys.jsonSimple; OpenPGP packets optional later

ADR to freeze.

Attestation envelope (v1 simple)

{
  "payload": { /* claim body as above */ },
  "payload_encoding": "json",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "key_id": "ed25519:…",
      "alg": "ed25519",
      "sig": "base64url",
      "signed_at": "2026-07-22T18:00:01Z"
    }
  ]
}

Signed bytes: canonical JSON of payload (rules in Contract: key sort, UTF-8, no insignificant whitespace) or hash of payload then sign hash. Pick one in Contract; prefer sign-over-hash of canonical payload.

Later (P2): DSSE envelope + in-toto statement for cosign/SLSA ecosystem alignment.

Verify algorithm

  1. Fetch attestation JSON.
  2. Load issuer key by key_id from key_url or local pin.
  3. Verify signature over payload (canonical).
  4. Recompute digest of local/canonical content; match subjects[].digest.
  5. Report: valid | bad_signature | content_mismatch | unknown_key | revoked.
  6. Display colophon fields regardless of validity, with clear banner if invalid.

Never report "this is 80% AI."

Key lifecycle (v1)

OperationBehavior
GenerateCLI creates Ed25519 keypair; private key local file; never log
PublishPublic key in keys.json at HTTPS URL
RotateNew key_id; old optional revoked_at; new claims use new key
DiscoverAbsolute HTTPS key_url inside signed claim (ADR-003); fetch issuer document from any durable host (not only self-hosted)
Social bootstrapIssuer card on profiles (fingerprint + keys URL); corroboration only (ADR-003 D7)
WoTOptional key-endorsement attestations listed on issuer document (ADR-003)
Dual roleHuman key and build key in one issuer document; human endorses build (ADR-004). Build MUST NOT endorse human.

Trust policy (verifier) — ADR-003

LevelMeaning
Crypto validSignature + content match; key_url integrity included in signed payload
Issuer recognizedPin of key_id, and/or path of crypto-valid key-endorsements from a pin (transitive WoT)
Policy acceptUser/org treats that recognized issuer as trusted for this class of content

SLSA lesson: separate crypto success from policy trust.

Identity fields: issuer.id = non-unique display slug. Cryptographic identity = key_id. Discovery channel = absolute key_url (signed). See ADR-003.

CLI surface (intent only; Contract later)

Command intentResult
colo example / editWrite colophon fields
claim buildBind subjects + colo → claim payload
signAttach signature with local key
`seal --all [--role human\build]`Walk content_globs; mixed/human → human key; generated → build key
endorseHuman key publishes a key-endorsement over the build key
publishCopy .innsigle/public → site /.well-known/innsigle/
verifyPath or URL to attestation + content
keygen / key publish-templateKey material + sample keys.json

Exact flags belong in Contract, not here.

Alignment matrix

Prior artInnsigle v1 choice
PGP WoTADR-003: signed key-endorsements published at issuer URL; ADR-004 uses that edge for human → build
DKIMSteal domain/URL-published pubkey + sig over content
in-totoSteal subject + predicate typing
SLSASteal provenance ≠ truth; policy separate
SigstoreOptional later keyless/transparency
C2PAOptional export; not primary store
SBOMSteal typed ingredients discipline
SloptimizerIngredient tool, not composition flip

Security notes

  • Private keys never in claims or site static files.
  • key_url must be HTTPS in production guidance.
  • Treat claim notes as untrusted display text (escape HTML).
  • Unsigned bills are allowed; UI must not look "more true" than signed ones

without labeling signed/unsigned clearly.

Open questions

  • [x] Freeze Ed25519 + canonicalization in ADR → ADR-001 accepted
  • [x] Claim/CLI normative surface → CONTRACT-001 (+ JSON Schema)
  • [x] Absolute issuer key_url in every signature + WoT endorsements → ADR-003
  • [ ] Type URI host (innsigle.dev vs azgaard.net path) when domain bought
  • [ ] Multi-subject release claims for whole site versions (schema allows array)
  • [x] Whether mixed needs sub-ratios → resolved: optional colophon.human_input (method hi1) — see session-provenance.md “Human-input measure (hi1)” and CONTRACT-001 v1.1
  • [ ] P2: map ingredients to IPTC digitalSourceType / C2PA assertions

Implementation sequence (suggested)

  1. ~~Schema JSON Schema + examples~~
  2. ~~ADR + Contract freeze~~ (ADR-001, CONTRACT-001, ADR-003)
  3. ~~Keygen + hash + sign + verify CLI~~ (src/cli.mjs, npm test)
  4. ~~Golden test vectors~~ (tests/vectors/, tests/vectors.test.mjs)
  5. ~~Docs footer + sample claim~~ (docs/sample/)
  6. ~~Mark exploration pack~~ (docs/sample/assets/marks/)
  7. ~~Brand explainer / public site~~ (docs-driven microsite + Pages)
  8. Feature specs FEAT-001–003 + walkthroughs
  9. CLI: HTTPS fetch keys + WoT path check; optional in-toto/DSSE export
  10. Session provenance capture skill + provenance build / propose-colo (FEAT-004)
Innsigle seal: model-primary by Innsigle (build key)

Signature covers the markdown source of this page, not these HTML bytes. This render quotes that seal.

Composition
model-primary
Issuer
Innsigle innsigle
Signing key
ed25519:050bf4d0361a96aa3b6baa3fc2ffd0cb (build key)
Signed source
docs/website/content/generated/artifacts/claim-system.md
Signed
2026-09-30T20:48:46Z
Content digest
sha256:d9f8d6b6…037086f4

Endorsed by the human key for seal recognition (ADR-003).

Raw attestation JSON
{
  "payload": {
    "innsigle": "1",
    "type": "https://innsigle.dev/claim/colophon/v1",
    "issued_at": "2026-09-30T20:48:46Z",
    "issuer": {
      "id": "innsigle",
      "name": "Innsigle",
      "key_id": "ed25519:050bf4d0361a96aa3b6baa3fc2ffd0cb",
      "key_url": "https://documentdrivendx.github.io/innsigle/.well-known/innsigle/keys.json"
    },
    "subjects": [
      {
        "uri": "https://documentdrivendx.github.io/innsigle/reference/artifacts/claim-system/",
        "digest": {
          "alg": "sha256",
          "value": "d9f8d6b6d69e5930ec7334d070223567d04882156c2ddd769528e93f037086f4"
        }
      }
    ],
    "colophon": {
      "schema_version": "1",
      "composition": "model-primary",
      "ingredients": [
        {
          "kind": "model",
          "name": "Claude",
          "role": "draft"
        },
        {
          "kind": "tool",
          "name": "sloptimizer",
          "role": "rewrite"
        },
        {
          "kind": "human",
          "name": "operator",
          "role": "structure-edit"
        }
      ],
      "notes": null
    }
  },
  "payload_encoding": "json",
  "signatures": [
    {
      "key_id": "ed25519:050bf4d0361a96aa3b6baa3fc2ffd0cb",
      "alg": "ed25519",
      "sig": "o7JmS387vtFxW9hvhyOVsB6KpjCkbhNxyncemtgVUCBnzCgWXFjQyIEdgkUMlXzkZZJHC8l2fenS-s6zIFelBQ",
      "signed_at": "2026-09-30T20:48:46Z"
    }
  ]
}