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Source frontmatter
ddx:
id: innsigle.contract.001
type: contract
links:
- target: innsigle.adr.001
kind: informed_by
- target: innsigle.design.claim-system
kind: informed_by
- target: innsigle.prd
kind: informed_by
- target: innsigle.adr.005
kind: informed_by
status: draft
activity: 02-design
created: 2026-07-22
Contract
Contract ID: CONTRACT-001 Type: schema + CLI Version: v1.2 Status: draft (normative for implementers; bump version on breaking field changes) Related: ADR-001; ADR-003; ADR-005; claim-system.md; PRD FR-1–4a, FR-8–12, FR-18–25
Purpose
Define the colophon claim document, attestation envelope, public key document, content hashing rules for v1, and CLI commands that produce and verify them.
Scope and Boundaries
- In scope: JSON claim payload; attestation envelope;
keys.json; SHA-256
content digests; Ed25519 sign/verify; CLI verbs listed below.
- Out of scope: C2PA embed; DSSE/in-toto wire format (MAY export later);
multi-tenant accounts; social platform APIs; HTML DOM normalization beyond "hash the file bytes given."
- Sibling type (FEAT-005): maker profiles (
innsigle_profile) and plain
colophon claims (https://innsigle.dev/claim/plain-colophon/v1) are unsigned declarations with no content digest. They are not this contract's claim payload. innsigle verify MUST reject them (exit 5) and MUST NOT print VALID.
- Owning system: Innsigle CLI / library (TypeScript + Bun assumed).
Normative Surface
Use MUST / MUST NOT / SHOULD / MAY as written.
Claim payload
A claim payload MUST be a JSON object with:
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
innsigle | string | yes | MUST be "1" for this version |
type | string (URI) | yes | MUST be https://innsigle.dev/claim/colophon/v1 until domain freeze changes it via version bump |
issued_at | string | yes | MUST be RFC 3339 UTC timestamp |
issuer | object | yes | See issuer object |
subjects | array | yes | MUST contain ≥1 subject |
colophon | object | yes | See colophon object |
issuer object
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
id | string | yes | Display slug (e.g. azgaard); not globally unique; not a crypto identifier (ADR-003) |
name | string | yes | Display name |
key_id | string | yes | MUST match a key in the issuer document; format ed25519:<fingerprint> |
key_url | string | yes | Absolute URL of the issuer document (ADR-003). Production MUST use https:. Relative URLs are invalid. http: only for loopback/tests. file: only for offline tests. Covered by the claim signature via ADR-001 JCS of the full payload. |
subject object
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
uri | string | no | Content locator when known |
digest | object | yes | alg MUST be "sha256"; value MUST be lowercase hex of SHA-256 |
colophon object
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
schema_version | string | yes | MUST be "1" |
composition | string | yes | MUST be one of human-authored, mixed, model-primary |
ingredients | array | yes | MAY be empty only if composition is human-authored and notes explain; SHOULD list tools/models when used |
notes | string or null | no | Free text; MUST NOT replace required composition honesty |
human_input | object | no | Declared human-input measure (v1.1); when present MUST satisfy the human_input rules below. MUST be omitted (never null) when journal evidence is absent |
ingredient object
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
kind | string | yes | MUST be one of model, tool, human, other |
name | string | yes | Non-empty |
role | string | no | e.g. draft, edit, rewrite |
version | string or null | no | Model/tool version when known |
uri | string | no | Link to tool/model docs |
human_input object (v1.1)
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
method | string | yes | MUST be "hi1" in this contract version |
basis | string | yes | MUST be "session-journal" |
percent | integer | yes | 0–100. MUST equal the round-half-up recomputation from the component raw counts and weights over non-null components (exact rationals, not floats) |
weights | object | yes | Integer weights per component; MUST match the method's published weights (hi1: direction 25, contribution 40, review 35) |
direction | object or null | yes | {percent, user_prompts, model_write_bursts}, all integers ≥ 0 |
contribution | object or null | yes | {percent, human_chars, model_chars, human_write_events, coverage}; coverage MUST be full or partial |
review | object or null | yes | {percent, post_output_prompts, review_events}, all integers ≥ 0 |
All numeric fields MUST be integers (JCS float hazards, ADR-001). contribution MUST be non-null — char evidence is the required core of the measure; a headline computed from direction/review alone would overstate human input on works with no char evidence. direction and review MUST be null when and only when there are no model write bursts. The measure is a maker declaration derived from the maker's own session journal (see session-provenance.md "Human-input measure (hi1)") — implementations MUST NOT present it as an AI-detection verdict about the text (PRD FR-20a), and MUST NOT alter component counts to reach a target percent.
Composition integrity: Implementations MUST NOT offer a mode that sets composition to human-authored solely because an editorial tool (including sloptimizer) rewrote model-primary text. Tools MUST be listable as kind: "tool".
Attestation envelope
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
payload | object | yes | MUST be a claim payload as above |
payload_encoding | string | yes | MUST be "json" |
signatures | array | yes | MUST contain ≥1 signature object for signed attestations |
signature object
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
key_id | string | yes | MUST match payload.issuer.key_id for the primary signature |
alg | string | yes | MUST be "ed25519" |
sig | string | yes | base64url (no padding) raw Ed25519 signature |
signed_at | string | yes | RFC 3339 UTC |
Bytes to sign (ADR-001): Let canonical = JCS(payload) per RFC 8785. Let h = SHA-256(canonical) (raw 32 bytes). sig MUST be Ed25519 signature of h using the issuer private key.
Unsigned claims MAY be distributed as payload-only JSON for display; they MUST NOT be labeled as signed in UI or CLI success paths.
Attestation file with reviews (v1.2, ADR-005)
A per-document attestation file MAY carry additional independently signed attestations beside the authorship claim:
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
payload, payload_encoding, signatures | yes | The authorship (colophon) attestation, exactly as above. Earlier verifiers read only these | |
reviews | array | no | Zero or more complete review attestations (envelope = payload, payload_encoding, signatures). Each is signed by its own key |
Producers that rewrite an attestation file (any seal path) MUST carry reviews over unchanged. The authorship signature MUST NOT cover reviews. Verifiers that do not know reviews ignore it.
Review claim (v1.2)
Type MUST be https://innsigle.dev/claim/review/v1. Schema: schemas/review-claim.schema.json; example: examples/review-claim.json.
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
innsigle | string | yes | "1" |
type | string | yes | Review type URI |
issued_at | string | yes | RFC 3339 UTC; the review date |
issuer | object | yes | As colophon claims; key_id is the reviewer's signing key |
subjects | array | yes | Exactly one subject; digest is the SHA-256 of the same bytes the colophon seal covers; uri optional |
review | object | yes | See below |
colophon | — | MUST NOT | A review claim MUST NOT carry a colophon (FR-4a) |
review object:
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
schema_version | string | yes | "1" |
reviewer | object | yes | {key_id, name?}; key_id MUST equal issuer.key_id; name optional non-empty — deployments MAY publish key ids only |
scope | "full" or array | no | Omitted means full; otherwise a non-empty array of unique, non-empty opaque claim ids |
expires_at | string | no | RFC 3339 UTC, MUST be after issued_at |
composition, human_input | — | MUST NOT | A review never states or alters composition |
Validity. A review is REVIEWED for content with digest X at time t iff: schema valid; signatures[0].key_id == issuer.key_id; the key exists, is not revoked, and the signature verifies over JCS(payload) (ADR-001); the key is human-role (ADR-005 D2); subjects[0].digest.value == X; and expires_at is absent or > t. Otherwise the state is REVIEW-INVALID(reason) (reasons: schema, key_mismatch, unknown_key, revoked_key, bad_signature, wrong_role), REVIEW-STALE (digest differs), or REVIEW-EXPIRED. Authenticity is decided before freshness. A key that is build-role by any rule MUST NOT be accepted as a reviewer.
Roles: human = config.keys.human (plus review.reviewer_key_ids) when pinned, otherwise keys.json role: "human", the signer of a valid build-signing endorsement, or the sole active key of a house with no build key. build = config.keys.build, keys.json role: "build", or the subject of a valid human-signed build-signing endorsement.
Derivation claim (v1.2)
Type MUST be https://innsigle.dev/claim/derivation/v1. Schema: schemas/derivation-claim.schema.json; example: examples/derivation-claim.json. Stored in a built tree at <tree>/.well-known/innsigle/derivations/<slug>.derivation.json.
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
innsigle, type, issued_at, issuer | yes | As above; issuer.key_id MUST be a build-role key endorsed (build-signing) by a human key | |
subjects | array | yes | ≥1 output: {path, digest{alg,value}, uri?}; path tree-relative posix, no leading /, no .. |
derivation.schema_version | string | yes | "1" |
derivation.transform | object | no | {name, version?} |
derivation.inputs | array | yes | ≥1 source: {path, id?, digest, reviews[]}; reviews holds human review attestations verbatim (never re-signed); MAY be empty (which verifies as review_missing) |
colophon | — | MUST NOT | A derivation transfers review, not authorship |
Verification (per output, in this order; each failure names its reason): output digest equals subjects[].digest (output_missing, output_mismatch); signature valid and key active (bad_signature, unknown_key, revoked_key); signer is build-role (wrong_role) and endorsed by a human key (build_key_unendorsed); every input has at least one embedded review that is REVIEWED for inputs[].digest at verification time (review_missing, review_stale, review_expired, review_invalid(…)). With a source tree, each inputs[].digest MUST equal the current source digest (source_changed). Bundles: all inputs MUST pass. Fan-out: a claim with N subjects is equivalent to N claims; a verifier indexes by output path and digest.
Content hashing of markdown with front matter
Unchanged: SHA-256 of the exact file bytes. Front matter is part of the content; no normalization. A configured document id (below) is read from front matter without affecting the digest.
Attestation key (v1.2)
Default attestation filename key is the project-relative path slug. With attestation_key: {"frontmatter": "<dotted.path>"} in .innsigle/config.json the key is id-<id> where <id> is the front-matter value, which MUST match ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,127}$ and be unique among content_globs; seal MUST fail (exit 5) on a missing, malformed or duplicate id.
Issuer document (at key_url)
Canonical document for key discovery and optional web-of-trust edges (ADR-003).
Preferred form (innsigle_issuer)
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
innsigle_issuer | string | yes | MUST be "1" |
issuer_id | string | yes | Display slug; SHOULD match claim issuer.id |
issuer_name | string | yes | Display |
keys | array | yes | ≥0 keys (empty means no active keys) |
endorsements | array | no | Default []. Index of key-endorsement attestations published by this issuer |
Legacy form (innsigle_keys)
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
innsigle_keys | string | yes | MUST be "1" (pre-ADR-003) |
issuer_id | string | yes | Display slug |
issuer_name | string | yes | Display |
keys | array | yes | Same as preferred form |
Verifiers MUST accept either form. Legacy form implies endorsements: [].
key object
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
key_id | string | yes | ed25519: + fingerprint |
alg | string | yes | "ed25519" |
public_key | string | yes | base64url 32-byte public key |
created_at | string | yes | RFC 3339 |
revoked_at | string or null | yes | null if active |
Fingerprint: lowercase hex of SHA-256 over the 32-byte public key, truncated to first 16 bytes (32 hex chars), prefixed as ed25519:<hex>.
endorsements[] index entry
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
attestation_url | string | yes | Absolute URL of a key-endorsement attestation JSON |
subject_key_id | string | yes | Endorsee key_id |
subject_key_url | string | yes | Absolute URL of endorsee issuer document |
issued_at | string | no | Hint only; attestation payload is authoritative |
Key-endorsement claim (ADR-003)
Optional claim type for web-of-trust edges. Type MUST be https://innsigle.dev/claim/key-endorsement/v1.
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
innsigle | string | yes | "1" |
type | string | yes | Key-endorsement type URI above |
issued_at | string | yes | RFC 3339 UTC |
issuer | object | yes | Endorser — same rules as colophon claims, including absolute key_url |
endorsement | object | yes | See below |
endorsement object
| Element | Type | Required | Rules |
|---|---|---|---|
subject_key_id | string | yes | Endorsee key fingerprint id |
subject_key_url | string | yes | Absolute URL of endorsee issuer document |
subject_issuer_id | string | no | Display slug of endorsee (non-unique) |
level | string | no | One of full, marginal, unknown (PGP-inspired; default full if omitted) |
purpose | string | no | MUST NOT claim content truth; default identity — trust for recognizing seals |
Key-endorsement attestations use the same envelope and ADR-001 crypto as colophon claims. They do not authenticate content honesty.
Signed key_url rules (normative)
- Producers of signed claims MUST set
issuer.key_urlto an absolute URL. - The signature (ADR-001) covers the full payload including
issuer.key_url. - Verifiers MUST discover keys using the signed
issuer.key_urlunless applying an explicit local pin/override. issuer.idMUST NOT be treated as a globally unique or cryptographic identifier.key_urlMAY be any durable HTTPS origin that serves the issuer document (self-hosted, git forge raw/Pages, static free host, etc.). Self-operated webserver is not required (ADR-003 D7).- Social profile text and “link in bio” fields MAY embed an issuer card (fingerprint + keys URL) for human discovery. Profile embeds are not signatures and MUST NOT be treated as cryptographic proof by themselves.
Content hashing (v1)
- For a subject that is a file, digest MUST be SHA-256 of the exact file
bytes the operator supplies (no silent transcoding).
- CLI MUST record the path or URI used when building the claim.
- HTML "live page" fetch MAY be supported later; v1 CLI MUST support local file
subjects.
CLI
Binary name: innsigle (package may ship as such).
| Command | Args (normative intent) | Behavior | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
innsigle init | --onepassword [--dir] [--site-url] [--issuer-*] [--vault] [--force] | MUST create house key custody outside the repo (1Password when --onepassword); MUST write all repo-local state under .innsigle/ only (no framework web-root detection); MUST stage public issuer document at .innsigle/public/keys.json for publish to site /.well-known/innsigle/keys.json; MUST write commit-safe .innsigle/config.json with key_id fingerprint and custody reference; MUST write agent-oriented publish instructions under .innsigle/; MUST NOT write private key material into the repo | ||||||
innsigle seal | <content> [--kind] [--colo] [--uri] [--out] `[--role human\ | build]` | MUST claim+sign using .innsigle/config.json issuer fields and 1Password (or --key); MUST write attestation under .innsigle/public/claims/ by default; MUST NOT require repeating issuer flags. When keys.human / keys.build are configured (ADR-004), MUST sign human-authored/mixed with the human key and model-primary with the build key unless --role overrides | |||||
innsigle seal --all | `[--role human\ | build] [--force]` | MUST walk content_globs; MUST pick composition from frontmatter when kind_from_frontmatter is set — with true, generated: true → model-primary else default_composition (default mixed); with {"field": "<name>"}, that frontmatter key MUST hold one of model-primary, human-authored, mixed, and a value outside that set MUST fail rather than coerce; MUST skip up-to-date claims signed by the same key_id; MUST skip (not fail) files whose role key is absent unless --role was required; MUST remove ORPHAN claims | |||||
innsigle endorse | --subject-key-id [--subject-key-url] [--purpose] [--level] | MUST sign a key-endorsement (ADR-003 D4) with the human key; MUST index it on the issuer document endorsements[]; MUST NOT let the build key endorse the human key | ||||||
innsigle review | <file> \ | --all \ | --stale `[--scope full\ | id,id] [--expires Nd\ | YYYY-MM-DD\ | RFC3339] [--reviewer-name N \ | --anonymous] [--yes] [--force]` | MUST sign with the human key only and MUST refuse --role build; MUST require a current authorship seal for the file; MUST require confirmation (TTY prompt or --yes; PROV-05); MUST merge into reviews[] (superseding only the same reviewer's older entries); MUST self-verify before writing; --all reviews in-scope files not currently REVIEWED, --stale only REVIEW-STALE/EXPIRED |
innsigle derive | --tree <dir> --from <src>… --output <path>… [--transform name@ver] [--require-review] [--out file] | MUST sign with an endorsed build key; MUST embed each source's currently valid reviews verbatim; with --require-review MUST refuse (exit 6) if any source has none; writes <tree>/.well-known/innsigle/derivations/ | ||||||
innsigle verify | --derived <tree> [--keys f] [--source-root dir] [--cover glob]… | MUST verify every derivation claim in the tree per the derivation rules and always requires a valid human review for every input; exit codes below | ||||||
innsigle verify --all | [--require-review] [--require-full-scope] | As before; with --require-review exits 6 when all seals are VALID but an in-scope claim lacks a valid, unexpired human review; exit 1 if any seal is not VALID | ||||||
innsigle status | [--reviews] | As before; adds REVIEWED / UNREVIEWED / REVIEW-STALE / REVIEW-EXPIRED / REVIEW-INVALID(reason) per claim when --reviews, --require-review, a review config object, or any stored review is present | ||||||
innsigle publish | [site-dir] | MUST copy .innsigle/public/ to <site-dir>/.well-known/innsigle/ | ||||||
innsigle keygen | --out-dir <dir> | MUST write private key (permissions 0600 when FS supports) and public material; MUST NOT print private key | ||||||
innsigle keys template | --issuer-id --issuer-name --public-key --key-id | MUST emit issuer document skeleton (innsigle_issuer preferred; includes endorsements: []) | ||||||
innsigle claim build | --content <file> --uri <uri?> --colo <colo.json> --issuer-* --key-url | MUST emit claim payload JSON; MUST reject non-absolute key_url (exit 5); MAY accept --bill as alias for --colo; MAY default issuer fields from .innsigle/config.json | ||||||
innsigle sign | --claim <file> --key <private?> | MUST emit attestation envelope; SHOULD refuse unsigned path if claim lacks absolute key_url; MAY load private key from --key, --op-ref, or .innsigle/config.json → 1Password (op read) | ||||||
innsigle verify | <content> or --attestation --content --keys | Short form MUST resolve attestation and keys from .innsigle/ (or published well-known next to content) when possible | ||||||
innsigle verify | --attestation <file> --content <file> `--keys <file\ | url>` | MUST exit 0 iff signature valid, key not revoked, and content digest matches; MUST exit non-zero otherwise. Identity/WoT recognition is separate (ADR-003). MUST reject maker profiles and plain-colophon documents (exit 5) and MUST NOT print VALID for them | |||||
innsigle colo example | `--kind model-primary\ | human-authored\ | mixed` | MUST print example colophon JSON; MAY accept bill example as alias | ||||
innsigle profile init | --id --name [--out-dir] [--url] [--bio] [--force] | MUST write profile.json + index.html without keys or .innsigle/ | ||||||
innsigle profile add | --title --kind [--url] [--model] [--ingredient] [--profile] | MUST append a kind=plain work; MUST refuse human-authored plus a model ingredient (FR-4a); MUST print a footer line | ||||||
innsigle profile render / footer / bio / validate / claim | [--profile] | Render standalone HTML; copy bio/footer; schema check; emit a plain-colophon JSON. MUST NOT call the verify success path |
verify exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0 | Valid signature, active key, content match |
| 1 | Usage / IO error |
| 2 | Bad signature |
| 3 | Content digest mismatch |
| 4 | Unknown or revoked key |
| 5 | Invalid schema invalid |
| 6 | (v1.2) Review chain failure: verify --all --require-review with an otherwise VALID tree, or verify --derived review_missing / review_stale / review_expired / review_invalid / source_changed. For verify --derived, 3 also covers output_missing/mismatch and no derivation, and 4 also covers wrong-role and unendorsed build keys |
verify stdout (human)
MUST include lines sufficient to see: result keyword (VALID / INVALID), issuer id, composition, and failure reason when invalid. MUST NOT print AI detection scores. The declared colophon.human_input measure MAY be printed with its method tag (it is a maker declaration, not a detection score).
Precedence and Compatibility
- Versioning:
innsiglefield andschema_version/innsigle_keys/
innsigle_issuer govern payload and issuer-document compatibility. Breaking changes MUST bump these and the contract version.
- Related decision records: ADR-001 (crypto), ADR-003 (issuer URL + WoT), ADR-004 (human vs build keys; derived pages quote source seals).
- Unknown JSON fields in payload: verifiers MUST ignore unknown fields when
verifying signatures (signature covers canonical form of known payload as signed; producers SHOULD avoid unknown fields in v1).
- Deprecation: announce in release notes; keep verify for prior
innsigle: "1"
for at least one minor series after a bump.
- v1.2 adds the review and derivation claim types, the optional
reviews[]
array on attestation files, attestation_key, config review, and exit code 6. Additive: existing attestation files, commands and exit codes are unchanged; v1.0/v1.1 verifiers ignore reviews[].
- v1.1 adds the optional
colophon.human_inputobject. Additive: colophon
schema_version stays "1"; v1 verifiers ignore it under the unknown-field rule and existing attestations remain valid.
Error Semantics
| Condition | Outcome | Retry |
|---|---|---|
| Missing file | exit 1 | no |
| Invalid JSON schema | exit 5 | no |
| Signature fail | exit 2 | no |
| Digest mismatch | exit 3 | no |
| Revoked key | exit 4 | no |
Examples
See:
docs/helix/02-design/examples/claim-model-primary-docs.jsondocs/helix/02-design/examples/keys.json(legacy keys-only)docs/helix/02-design/examples/issuer-document.json(ADR-003 issuer + endorsements index)docs/helix/02-design/examples/key-endorsement-claim.jsondocs/helix/02-design/examples/review-claim.json,
document-with-review.attestation.json, derivation-claim.json (golden copies in tests/vectors/review/)
innsigle keygen --out-dir ~/.config/innsigle/azgaard
innsigle claim build --content ./site/index.html --uri https://example.com/ \
--colo ./colo.json --out claim.json
innsigle sign --claim claim.json --key ~/.config/innsigle/azgaard/ed25519.priv \
--out claim.attestation.json
innsigle verify --attestation claim.attestation.json --content ./site/index.html \
--keys ./keys.json
Non-Normative Notes
- Type URI host
innsigle.devis provisional until domain purchase. - JCS libraries: implement or depend on a reviewed RFC 8785 implementation;
golden vectors will live under tests/vectors/ when code lands.
- Social UC often uses mark assets without per-post
sign.
Validation Checklist
- [x] Normative fields and rules explicit
- [x] Compatibility rules explicit
- [x] Error / exit codes explicit
- [x] Tests can be derived (golden vectors + CLI exits)
- [x] Non-normative section separated
Innsigle seal: model-primary by Innsigle (build key)
Signature covers the markdown source of this page, not these HTML bytes. This render quotes that seal.
- Composition
- model-primary
- Issuer
- Innsigle
innsigle - Signing key
ed25519:050bf4d0361a96aa3b6baa3fc2ffd0cb(build key)- Signed source
docs/website/content/generated/artifacts/contracts/contract-001-claim-and-cli.md- Signed
- 2026-11-10T13:38:16Z
- Content digest
sha256:3261c2e3…e34f815c
Endorsed by the human key for seal recognition (ADR-003).
Raw attestation JSON
{
"payload": {
"innsigle": "1",
"type": "https://innsigle.dev/claim/colophon/v1",
"issued_at": "2026-11-10T13:38:16Z",
"issuer": {
"id": "innsigle",
"name": "Innsigle",
"key_id": "ed25519:050bf4d0361a96aa3b6baa3fc2ffd0cb",
"key_url": "https://documentdrivendx.github.io/innsigle/.well-known/innsigle/keys.json"
},
"subjects": [
{
"uri": "https://documentdrivendx.github.io/innsigle/reference/artifacts/contracts/contract-001-claim-and-cli/",
"digest": {
"alg": "sha256",
"value": "3261c2e35dbaa0f5b3c36d21914e8367cccce5924a87301cb3a4b9d2e34f815c"
}
}
],
"colophon": {
"schema_version": "1",
"composition": "model-primary",
"ingredients": [
{
"kind": "model",
"name": "Claude",
"role": "draft"
},
{
"kind": "tool",
"name": "sloptimizer",
"role": "rewrite"
},
{
"kind": "human",
"name": "operator",
"role": "structure-edit"
}
],
"notes": null
}
},
"payload_encoding": "json",
"signatures": [
{
"key_id": "ed25519:050bf4d0361a96aa3b6baa3fc2ffd0cb",
"alg": "ed25519",
"sig": "_3dkfqS7vh45Jy12NPfygWshDnAsjdjuVtAy0vHNg7jpNQUrfVGeuyU9G4in6Qjo14HCTdhJNIiDdGFrCyHcBg",
"signed_at": "2026-11-10T13:38:16Z"
}
]
}